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Agency is a notion that brings together, in undoubt-
edly ambiguous ways, a variety of concerns that 
currently echo in diverse segments of the architec-
tural debate. Amongst such concerns is that of the 
role of the architect to effect social or political change, 
a preoccupation with the performative power of the 
architectural object, and perhaps essentially, the 
hope and despair about the efficacy of theory in the 
world at large. We set out to elicit a conversation 
addressing the multifarious notion of agency in the 
broadest possible way, while at the same time locat-
ing novel points of intersection between concerns 
too often perceived as disconnected.
Interrogating agency theoretically leads first of 
all to the question of its binary coupling with struc-
ture, perhaps one of the most central concepts in 
the understanding of modern society. Secondly, 
because agency is intimately linked to the idea of a 
possible ‘acting otherwise’, it assumes intentionality 
and criticality, both of which have resonated strongly 
in the architectural debate. A third fundamental 
issue, which will allow a better understanding of 
agency within the specific context of architecture, is 
that of the architectural object and its complex rela-
tion to the individual and the social. 
The following text has been assembled from sepa-
rate interviews with three prominent scholars who 
have, from different fields, made particular contri-
butions to these issues. Antoine Picon, historian of 
architecture and technology at Harvard University, 
interviewed in Paris on 3 December 2008, is widely 
recognised for his contributions to the historical 
formation of the architectural discipline, the role 
of utopia in architecture, and the impact of digital 
culture. Scott Lash, professor of sociology and 
cultural studies at Goldsmiths College, has chal-
lenged dominant understandings of agency and 
structure through his influential writings on the notion 
of reflexivity, and the question of critique and cultural 
production in contemporary information society. The 
interview with Scott Lash took place in London on 
23 January 2009. Margaret Crawford, professor in 
architecture and urban studies at Harvard Univer-
sity, is widely known for her work on ‘the everyday’ 
in the built environment, and its political implications 
within and beyond architectural and urban practice. 
She has responded to our questions via email in 
December 2008. 
Agency versus structure: how to position archi-
tecture?
[London, 23 January 2009] Kenny Cupers and 
Isabelle Doucet: Cast in opposition to the notion 
of structure, agency has been one of the central 
questions in the humanities and social sciences. 
Influenced by various strands of Marxism, agency 
also tended to be associated with the intention to 
effect social change against existing societal struc-
tures. The structure/agency binary has in certain 
ways organised large parts of the theoretical 
landscape, assembling proponents on either side - 
Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim, for instance - or 
proposals for a middle ground - like those of Bourdieu 
or Giddens. Nevertheless, more recent work on the 
8ded in the material, immanent. It’s not dualist in 
the sense that Western thought is. Even if we 
want to talk about immanence in the West, it’s an 
immanence after the dualism. Whether it’s Latour, 
Deleuze or anybody. But the Chinese never had 
the dualism. Chinese thought has immanence but it 
also involves abstraction. It’s just a different kind of 
abstraction, a more pictorial one perhaps rather than 
our phonetic, alphabetic one. We thought, with the 
Greeks, in terms of elements, fire, water, air, earth. 
The Chinese had a different kind of thinking - the jin 
and the jang - hence another kind of abstraction. 
But the big thing for me, in terms of action, is that 
for us it involves a subject-verb-object type of thing 
- you set your goal, and it’s very direct. In China, 
everything is very indirect, and comes out of the 
situation. A lot of sentences don’t have a verb nor 
a subject. There is not an ‘I’. People place them-
selves, situate themselves. So things are very 
spatial. Spatial, temporal, relational. But not subject-
verb-object. So there is abstract thought, but it’s not 
dualist and not subject-verb-object. It’s not classical 
agency at all. Is it classical structure? I don’t know.
Kenny Cupers: So if structure has lost its explana-
tory power, what do we do then with the notion of 
agency? If we no longer have this fundamental 
binary, everything that we used to be able to get 
at through the notion of agency - social or political 
relevance, the concept of action or social change, 
and even intentionality itself - no longer coheres, 
does it? 
Scott Lash: I think also phenomenological inten-
tionality presumes agency, not just instrumental 
classical theory. Giddens is following classical 
Parsons/Weber, rather than the kind of Husserlian 
intentionality. But I think even that is a problem in 
a sense. I’m so much on the border of all this, I’m 
going to be so influenced by China, but on the other 
hand I’m always a Westerner. But structure... I don’t 
know.
‘non-linear’ or horizontal workings of power, reflexiv-
ity, the powers of invention, or flows and networks 
calls this dichotomy fundamentally into question. Is 
the notion of agency then still meaningful, once we 
disengage it from its coupling with structure, and 
shed it of its ‘progressive’ aura?
Scott Lash: I have a very strong position about this 
at the moment, and it comes from my research in 
China of the past three years. In terms of agency, 
I think there are a lot of problems with Western 
notions of agency, and Western notions of the indi-
vidual. I am quite influenced by François Jullien in 
this matter. Agency presumes a notion of the goal-
directed actor. At least for a sociologist like Giddens 
or myself, agency comes from the classic notions 
developed by Weber and Parsons, and presumes 
two kinds of actions: ends-oriented and means-
oriented ones. Or, in other words, instrumental and 
substantively rational ones. Compare it to Kant’s 
first and second critiques. Both presume that the 
agent sets up a model that he or she will follow. 
Goal-oriented stuff basically. It presumes a disem-
bodied, rational kind of model.
Against this, I would like to suggest the notion 
of activity. Activity is much less goal-directed, it is 
much more situational. It’s like situationism in a way: 
you put yourself down anywhere, and see where it 
takes you. In China, it’s like that: you analyse the 
situation, and see what arises from it. This also 
involves abstract thinking, but of a different kind 
than agency-type thinking. Agency-type thinking 
presumes a subject-verb-object kind of thinking: 
this is the object, and this is my plan. It’s almost a 
kind of scientific model you follow. 
Isabelle Doucet: When you say abstract but in a 
different form, do you mean more from the inside 
rather than the outside?
Scott Lash: I used to think that Chinese thought 
wasn’t abstract. That it was completely embed-
9that as well I think, like the economy. I’m really into 
this in major ways, as you can hear.
[Paris, 3 December 2009] Kenny Cupers and 
Isabelle Doucet: While we understand the notion of 
agency first of all in opposition to that of structure - 
in humanities and social science debates - we are 
interested in understanding its particular importance 
in architecture. How have architects understood 
agency? The recent enthusiasm about the notion 
of agency in architecture debates seems to us to 
be shaped by a fundamental conflation: agency is 
used simultaneously as a concept to interrogate the 
social concernedness of the profession - the idea 
that architects can or should effect social change - 
and the performative role of the architectural object 
- its efficacy with regards to clients’ or users’ expec-
tations. What is for you the specificity of the notion 
of agency for architecture?
Antoine Picon: First of all, by agency, do you mean 
effectiveness, the fact that theoretical reflection has 
some impact on practice?
Kenny Cupers: Yes, as well as the more oppositional 
definition of agency as the individual’s capacity for 
intentional action against what is perceived as hege-
monic, or the structural constraints of society.
Antoine Picon: That for me is a very Anglo-Amer-
ican definition. The French are not that obsessed 
with this definition, because we don’t believe that 
much in individuals. Even in Lefebvre, as far as I 
remember, it’s about the structure of everyday life, 
so it remains very structural. In any case, I don’t 
think the neo-Marxist position, of architecture as 
a critical agency, is a very general feature in the 
architectural debate at the moment. Performativity, 
or architecture doing what it does, seems to be a 
more general interest. The real question for me, 
however, is how to construct a political and social 
relevance for architecture today - relevance more 
than perhaps ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense. We 
Kenny Cupers: But does structure become situation 
then?
Scott Lash: Well, you’ve said it.... Yes, maybe 
structure needs to be rethought in certain ways. I 
do think that we have agency in the West. Okay, 
not exactly, but pretty close. And I do think we have 
structure in certain ways. Structure is an interesting 
question, you know; what is structure exactly? I 
don’t want to go back to Levi-Strauss or Althusser, 
but... I think maybe you’re right, if we’re going to 
try to think about it from a Chinese point of view, 
the notion of structure would have to change. The 
Western contract - rights and obligations - is very 
well-defined. In China, it’s not very well-defined, 
and it’s much more long-term. And it’s continually 
negotiated. So in a funny way this kind of relation 
takes on a structure itself. And I think you’re right, 
it might be a bit more like a situation, but it’s also 
something that almost has its own temporality, 
rather than the classical, timeless kind of structure 
à la Levi-Strauss. 
Kenny Cupers: If you look back from China to the 
West, how do you think we can think differently 
about agency here?
Scott Lash: Something more situational first of all. 
There is something like transaction cost theory in 
the West, which means transactions finish and then 
what are the costs. But what if you never stop trans-
acting? Think of a business or economic relation as 
a continuing transaction. The other person I’ve been 
using a lot is the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern: 
in The Gender and the Gift she collapses the gift 
and the market, the commodity and the gifts you 
give - something that is going on in China. I think 
the very anonymity of our monetary system, and the 
chopping up of loans into bits is part of the problem 
of Western capitalism. And if we had something that 
was more relational, more long-term, more transac-
tional, then we would not be in the mess that we’re 
in now. And an oppositional politics can work like 
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that the working class was the true engine of history, 
and that the big goal was the social state. The strat-
egy to get there, then, was what people disagreed 
about. I think today we are in the opposite situation: 
we have the same strategies - and this is why capi-
talism resembles alternative movements, they both 
use networks and so on - but the objectives are very 
discrepant. I think this is different for architecture, 
because it has uncertainties at every level. While 
there seems to be a relative consensus amongst 
architects about what reality is - through notions like 
emergence and so on - both strategy and objective 
remain totally unclear. That’s the difference with 
political movements, where the reality and goals 
are unclear but the strategies are known. This is 
probably where the specificity of architecture lies 
vis-à-vis politics at large.
[Email correspondence December 2009] Margaret 
Crawford: The dualism of agency versus structure 
certainly needs to be questioned but I don’t believe 
that either the ‘non-linear’ flows and networks 
approach or the ‘third way’ deals with this issue in 
a satisfactory way. The important thing is to find 
an opening for politics. It is clear that the period of 
extreme critiques (we might call these Xcritiques) 
in which criticality developed its own rules and 
momentum, is over. Xcritique virtually eliminated all 
political possibilities. Theoreticians attacked every 
imaginable topic with such critical ferocity that, after 
they were done, only a pile of ashes remained. 
Instead, we need to acknowledge that dualisms, 
whatever their weaknesses, will not disappear. 
Epistemologically we can’t do without them. So we 
need to deal with them more effectively. Instead of 
opposing big chunks of theory (like structure and 
agency), we need to take some scissors, cut them 
into smaller pieces and then reconfigure the pieces. 
Examining specific issues, precisely locating them 
in their contexts, then investigating the ways these 
dualities interact, overlap and intermingle as well as 
contradict each other. This should produce a more 
nuanced and refined use of theory.
know the traps to avoid. One of them is the belief 
that architecture is going to change the world, in a 
kind of mechanistic way. We now know it is not a 
question of multiplying social housing, although it 
cannot hurt, but it’s not enough and it’s not going 
to happen everywhere in the world. We know that 
architecture is always a partial project, an unfinished 
project, by definition incomplete. So how exactly 
does it have political and social relevance? That is 
the question. You could even say that architecture 
is always a failure; it never accomplishes what it 
intends. So how can it still be socially and politically 
relevant today? Although there are optimistic dreams 
of a return to a kind of neo-cybernetic modernity, 
criticality most of the time implies that we know we 
cannot go back to the ideal city, or the ideal regional 
plan. Diametrically opposed then, is to fully accept 
globalisation, to do only what the client asks, and 
to be a puppet of market forces. These are the two 
symmetric pitfalls. You can position yourself as a 
bit more Marxist, or a bit more ‘performalist’ - more 
inspired by neoliberalism. I think this is how the 
debate is framed today.
Isabelle Doucet: What is interesting here is that 
those are also precisely the two camps where the 
notion of agency is harnessed today. What does this 
mean for our understanding of agency in architec-
ture? 
Antoine Picon: This is the argument of Luc Boltanski 
and Eve Chiapello in Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, 
namely that the new spirit of capitalism is heavily 
inspired by alternative movements and ideologies. 
Capitalism today is all about emergence, creativity, 
indetermination, and so on, which is exactly the 
vocabulary of neo-alternative movements. This is 
the fundamental ambiguity of today. It reminds me 
of an interesting comment I heard recently, namely 
that the left in the twentieth century was generally 
in agreement about both the main goals, and the 
fundamentals of the situation. Class for instance: 
social democrats and communists alike, all agreed 
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criticality emerges. Critical moments occur when 
history and theory interconnect. This is how I under-
stand Tafuri’s notion of criticality. The critical project, 
and critical theory, basically took off with the end 
of modernism. When modernism got criticised and 
gradually abandoned, it was a problem for both 
theory and history, and led to a rewriting of some of 
its basic presuppositions.
Isabelle Doucet: Do you think we might be facing a 
similar situation today?
Antoine Picon: I think we might very well be heading 
towards a similar movement today, a similar meeting 
of theory and history. Digital culture for example, 
clearly challenges several critical assumptions of 
architecture. Tectonics, but also scale, is seriously 
challenged by digital culture. Theorists and critics 
used to take the relation between architecture and 
scale for granted. Today, however, architecture’s 
natural relation to scale is accepted as socially 
constructed. In a similar way, the so-called return 
of ornaments calls for a re-examination of what 
is traditionally understood as ornament. In short, 
digital culture challenges some of the foundations 
of practice, and we are confronted with a new criti-
cal stance. In this situation we need history to make 
sense again of architecture’s own tradition. So, yes, 
I think we might very well be at a new convergence 
between history and theory. 
Isabelle Doucet: What you say seems very much 
in opposition to claims by architects like Somol and 
Whiting, and others advocating a so-called ‘post-
critical’ approach. 
Antoine Picon: I think that the so-called ‘post-criti-
cality’ as promoted by Whiting and others is actually 
the normal condition for theory, namely to be acriti-
cal. What they theorise as a shift is actually the 
normal development: as soon as paradigms get 
accepted, they are simply no longer perceived as 
critical or innovating, and are in that sense per defi-
Criticality: what to do with theory and practice?
[Paris, 3 December 2009] Kenny Cupers and 
Isabelle Doucet: The notion of agency implies not 
only intentionality and free will, but also the possi-
bility of criticality. In architecture, this possibility 
- fostered by critical theory and continuing to haunt 
contemporary practice, whether in the guise of ‘criti-
cal practice’ or ‘the projective’ - assumes an often 
ambiguous relation between theory and practice. 
How and where can we see criticality at work, as 
part of theoretical reflection, or in the domain of 
practice? In other words, what is the location of criti-
cality?
Antoine Picon: Criticality has perhaps been over-
rated in architecture. It is a notion that comes from 
very specific contexts - primarily Italy with Tafuri - 
and has been imported in the United States in very 
peculiar ways. Architecture is primarily a practice, 
not necessarily a discipline. It corresponds to a 
series of disciplines, and a practice is not all the 
time critical. It’s actually most of the time acritical. 
Likewise theory in architecture has no real criti-
cal approach. Most of the time critics do not have 
a real autonomy vis-à-vis designers - how would a 
critic survive if he would constantly oppose them? 
The traditional role of theories in art, except in very 
specific moments, is actually to confirm that they 
are indeed guidelines or principles in the practice of 
an art. This is exactly the opposite of criticality. It is 
a very peculiar turn of mind in fact, to consider that 
the primary concern of theory is to be critical. I see 
history as having a more critical role, because it is a 
deconstruction of the conditions of the past and an 
exploration of how things change, how the present 
is constantly jeopardised by historical change. I 
would say the ‘normal’ state would be for theory to 
be acritical and for history to be critical.
Of course there are specific moments in which 
art, as a practice, is concerned about its founda-
tion - for example when it is undergoing important 
changes. It is in such moments that a need for 
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Antoine Picon: Two things. First of all, at the begin-
ning of a new ideological construction, the big 
dilemma for historians is to use the ideology they’re 
embedded in, while at the same time being aware 
that it will eventually change. More than practition-
ers, historians therefore need to be self-critical and 
avoid getting too embedded. Secondly, if we take 
the understanding of field, radiance, and so on 
seriously, mapping becomes crucial. Agency is to 
be first understood through new innovative ways of 
mapping. We need to ask again what the catego-
ries of mapping are. This implies that the question 
of representation - in the almost artistic sense - 
becomes crucial.
Isabelle Doucet: What do you mean concretely by 
mapping in this context? How does it relate to the 
metaphorical use of maps and diagrams in architec-
ture at the moment?
Antoine Picon: There is a huge question for example 
about how to map networks. And mapping is also 
about how you understand theory, for instance 
in network theory, the degree of connectivity of a 
network, how you visualise that, and so on. The 
reason why I am sceptical about diagrams is that 
they are simplified maps, and how can we simplify 
maps that we don’t have yet at our disposal? I 
propose mapping primarily as a project for history 
and theory. Part of the function of architecture is to 
displace things, and metaphor is one way to do so. 
That’s why practitioners use maps by displacing it 
in the metaphoric sense. And that’s why most of the 
diagrams architects produce are too normative and 
simplifying.
Isabelle Doucet: What are then the potentials for a 
critical practice based on shortening the distance 
between theory and practice?
Antoine Picon: Compared to architectural critics 
and theorists who attempt to follow as close as 
possible in the footsteps of practitioners, I have, 
nition post-critical.
Kenny Cupers: What you call the ‘normal state’ 
prompts for me the question of what the distinc-
tion is then between art and architecture in this 
respect. For example, if we consider the idea of 
the avant-garde - whether we understand its task 
as to revolutionise art for itself, or to dissolve its 
boundaries with everyday life - what is at stake for 
architecture is different than for artistic practice, say 
painting for instance.
Antoine Picon: What if we would actually let go of 
this idea of the avant-garde? One of the major differ-
ences between art and architecture is that art, to be 
political, needs to take a critical stance - or reside 
in the avant-garde pathos. Architecture, to be politi-
cal, does not necessarily need to be avant-garde. 
It needs to do what it does. Architecture is deeply 
‘performative’ in its political stance. So I think archi-
tecture becomes political at moments of suspension 
of its clear political meaning. Tafuri’s criticality, for 
example, came in when all the assumptions regard-
ing the participation of architecture in the modern 
project were challenged, when architecture no 
longer had a clear political position. Architecture is 
always both about the reproduction of society as is, 
and about proposing an alternative future: architec-
ture is always between ideology and utopia. Today 
we are faced with a renewed question of criticality, 
because architecture is in a real need to redefine its 
political agency and to reposition itself, in terms of 
sustainability for instance, because we just simply 
cannot go on designing Prada shops. I think what 
we’re looking for is a new ideology, a new standard 
regime or belief about architecture’s agency in the 
world at large. This means we also need to rethink 
architecture’s relationship with utopia.
Kenny Cupers: What then would be the reper-
cussions and potentials for doing research in 
architecture?
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academics, and to be both the practitioners and 
the academics. But it has never really worked. 
It’s true that with the digital, the producer can be 
the consumer - the internet was the first product 
designed solely by its users - so there are short 
circuits. But one should not exaggerate. Architects 
ultimately want to build. This does not mean archi-
tects cannot be true academics at some point in their 
lives or make significant contributions to the debate 
(take Koolhaas for example). Conversely, critics like 
Sanford Kwinter make significant contributions to 
the intellectual debate by being very close to the 
world of design. But I don’t think you can forever 
maintain the distinction.
[Email correspondence December 2009] Margaret 
Crawford: The problem with the narrative of ‘critical-
ity’ followed by ‘post-criticality’ is that, in architecture, 
criticality was never actually critical. Its concerns 
were so distant from the real economic, political 
and social issues that the profession and archi-
tectural production faced, that it ended up serving 
as an excuse to disengage and pursue a purely 
formalist practice. Thus, ‘post-criticality’, by simply 
inverting an already fictional ‘criticality’, produced 
an equally questionable acceptance of the status 
quo.  Instead, I would propose a more flexible criti-
cality which addresses specific questions and can 
be selectively critical about things that really matter. 
This could provide an opening for a more politically 
engaged approach to architecture, grounded in the 
complex realities of contemporary life. 
[London, 23 January 2009] Kenny Cupers and 
Isabelle Doucet: Dissociated yet engaged, archi-
tectural theory seems to take on the nature of 
contemporary cultural critique: it is neither launched 
from a transcendental, privileged position, nor fully 
immersed in the velocity of contemporary produc-
tion. If we agree to ‘follow the object’ as you suggest, 
and accept the ambiguous nature of this relation, 
can criticality without transcendence still be critical? 
Can we conceive of forms for critique that do not 
probably because I am a historian, different obses-
sions. I rather ask myself: what is the picture, what 
is the general configuration of the ballet, what are 
the dancers doing?
Kenny Cupers: That seems to imply a fundamental 
belief in a form of distance to practice.
Antoine Picon: I think, ultimately, historians are 
fascinated by two things: what people have in the 
head, and how they behave. And then the possible 
relations between the two. An architectural historian 
is not indifferent to practical questions: he is fasci-
nated by practice yet he is not a practitioner. 
Kenny Cupers: What do you think about the argu-
ment that, because of the speed of contemporary 
culture, it is necessary to follow the object closely, 
and thus to collapse the distance of the researcher 
with the object of research? 
Antoine Picon: That to me is a little bit to reinvent 
the wheel. In the humanities and social sciences 
there is always a conflict between a deep, emphatic 
understanding of the object, and the need to take 
a distance from it. This is the old dilemma of the 
ethnologist and of all the modern social sciences 
more generally: you’re supposed to be both inside 
and outside of the thing you are investigating. For 
example, if you want to research the way new 
modelling software is changing architecture, you 
need an understanding of that software. In other 
words, I would argue for participation to a certain 
extent. 
Isabelle Doucet: If criticality is to be located mainly 
in the realm of history, is the idea of a self-reflexive 
or critical architecture practice then a contradiction 
in terms?
Antoine Picon: No, I think, as a practitioner, you 
have to be critical. Yet, only up to a certain point. 
Architects have always been tempted to erase 
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ing here about Durkheim and Benjamin. In his 
piece on ‘the languages of man’, Benjamin talks 
about the distinction between thing- or animal-
language, and man-language. While the first two 
work through images and mimesis, man-language 
is always symbolic. Durkheim, in ‘Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life’, also makes the distinction 
between symbols and images. Even animals can 
have images, and his critique of empiricism is that 
it works through an image-logic, a tabula rasa and 
then images. And I am convinced we are irreducibly 
symbolic creatures. There is the symbolic and it is 
important. But today, it has become fragmented, 
as I said in Another Modernity and other people 
have done too, using Benjamin. What I now think 
we need to work for, is a culture sector in which, in 
a very imaginative way, the cultural, the symbolic 
and the real are stitched together. We can no longer 
think of the symbolic, real, and imaginary as being 
ordered on different levels: they are on the same 
level; they can be manipulated, and are malleable. 
All three are equally important. Whether you’re an 
architect, artist, thinker, new media activist, or politi-
cal activist, you’re always stitching all three together 
in very different ways. 
Isabelle Doucet: So how could we rethink criticality 
in this respect? And what kind of relation between 
theory and practice would it imply?
Scott Lash: I’m taking on critical theory much more 
than I was. Critique of Information was in a lot of 
ways anti-critical theory, or at least, it was defining 
critical theory in a way nobody would accept it as 
critical theory. The same counts for Global Culture 
Industry, which was still completely Deleuzian.
Isabelle Doucet: Global Culture Industry was indeed 
very much focused on the real; it was very descrip-
tive. So if we were to rethink criticality it wouldn’t 
be through either the real, or the symbolic, or the 
imaginary, but through all three at the same time?
resort to the notion of distance, and that thus entail 
a different relation between theory and practice?
Scott Lash: Doing research in China makes you 
return to who we are, in the West. We are Greek, 
maybe Christian Greek, maybe Jew Greek... the 
Greekness, it’s science, it’s logic, it’s subject-verb-
object thinking, it’s the grammar, it’s ontology. But 
what’s happening in China is not ontology; it’s 
something else. Basically, critical thinking comes 
from the Jew-Greek and it is not ontological. It 
always includes the messianic, the utopian, that 
is, a ‘to come’. When I say critical theory, I mean 
Benjamin, some of Derrida, Agamben, or Adorno. 
Heidegger is clearly ontology: being is always 
already there, as opposed to the ‘to come’ of 
Agamben for instance [‘The Coming Community’]. 
Deleuze is not a ‘to come’ at all, he’s more like 
Heidegger in that sense. The critical goes back to 
Kant of course. When he explains enlightenment, 
it means asking ‘what can I know?’, ‘what should 
I do?’, and ‘what can I hope for?’. The ‘what can 
I know?’ is the first critique, it is knowledge; ‘what 
should I do?’ is the second critique, it’s ethics. But 
that’s not yet critique! Critique is in the third one, the 
‘what can I hope for?’, which entails the utopian and 
the messianic: that’s where critique is. And it works 
out of the ontological. Ontological difference is the 
difference between Being and beings. But this is not 
at all what Derrida is doing: when he talks about 
difference, he starts from ontology, but it goes to the 
border between what’s ontological and what is not. 
And that is why I think Derrida, Levinas, and others 
talk about infinity. Heidegger’s ontology by contrast 
is finite: finite beings up against death. I think that’s 
where critique is most interesting to me. 
In Global Culture Industry we focused on the 
real, the let-it-happen, while the symbolic was 
only there in fragments. What I would now prob-
ably say is that, apart from the real, the symbolic 
is important, and so is the imaginary. All three are 
important. We can’t help but symbolise. I’m think-
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intentionality, in the interactions of people and 
(architectural) objects, seems hardly revolutionary 
at first sight. Does the focus on objects, images, 
and processes in architecture - instead of actors, 
classes or causalities as in many social sciences 
and humanities disciplines - entail a fundamental 
difference in the way agency is understood?
Antoine Picon: I would like to respond to this question 
by way of the changing importance of the individual. 
Part of the difficulty we have today is what to make 
of a more and more individualised society, as 
described by many scholars, for instance François 
Ascher in the French context. Traditionally, political 
agency was made synonymous with class struc-
ture. The question was how to position architecture 
in the class structure debate. Even if you were a 
right-wing person wanting to re-institute community, 
class remained the starting point. We are very ill at 
ease today with a society where inequality, and thus 
also class inequality, has all but disappeared, but at 
the same time the most significant experiences in 
life are based on the individual. In other words, what 
the political agency for architecture is in an age of 
Facebook remains very unclear. What is utopia in 
an age of individuality? Utopia used to be all about 
the collective, so what kind of collective can we 
build in an age for individuals, and of individual 
destiny? The only progress today is the fulfilment of 
individual destiny, in some ways, but I think we have 
to reinvent the engine of a global destiny. Right 
now we live in an age of suspension or shock, in an 
eternal present that is threatened by apocalypse, by 
an abrupt ending - be it global warming or global 
terrorism, always something inevitably global. But 
I don’t think this will last, I see it as a kind of transi-
tional phase.
Kenny Cupers: If we take this condition of indi-
viduality as a basis, then what does this mean for 
our understanding of intentionality? Not only as 
it pertains to the production of architecture, but 
also because it necessarily entails the question of 
Scott Lash: Actually, it would be an inventive 
re-stitching together of all three, and also of the frag-
ments of all three, fragments of something that was 
much more integral in the past. It would suggest not 
just a celebration of the real against the other two, 
but also the importance of the symbolic, and the 
imaginary. To have a politics, we need to work with 
all these fragments. We need a little more pattern, 
a little less noise. 
Isabelle Doucet: And also... a more critical approach 
perhaps?
Scott Lash: Yeah, and more critical too. The credit 
crunch has discredited not only the Anglo-American 
model and consumer culture, but also the positive 
fetishisation of invention. The trick is how to lose 
some of the consumer culture, and keep all the 
invention. I think what’s going on in China, and what 
also preoccupies the West, is the bringing together 
of relationality and invention - in some kind of critical 
mode. Even if I don’t particularly like capitalism and 
commodification, it is just true that markets are and 
always have been a space, not just of commodity 
exchange, but of invention. Global Culture Indus-
try was about nothing but invention. But then I saw, 
through China, a much more relational side. Capi-
talism and invention, when they get out of hand, 
become destructive, for example of the environ-
ment. I don’t want to lose the invention bit, but it’s 
not the whole story. We are programmed into inven-
tion but also into commodification. The question I 
am addressing right now is how we can keep all the 
stuff that we need, while at the same time chang-
ing. 
The object and the individual: what are the inten-
tions of architecture?
[Paris, 3 December 2009] Kenny Cupers and Isabelle 
Doucet: Recent work in the social studies of science 
has taken the analysis of agency to include objects 
and ‘non-human actors‘. In architecture however, 
the idea that agency can be situated beyond human 
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Kenny Cupers: How would this shift in the way we 
think about materiality and the individual be able to 
help us to understand the social in architecture?
Antoine Picon: This is my intellectual obsession 
at the moment: to understand how we feel things 
differently, experience differently. This transcends 
the idea of the cyborg, because I think the entire 
sensorium is redefined as a result of this new 
conception of the subject. Digital culture for me was 
always the symptom of something else, rather than 
a sort of magical trigger. I am not a technological 
determinist. One of the reasons for the success of 
Deleuze is that rethinking continuity was the big 
philosophical issue, which also explains the return 
of landscape, and also of the city. What happens 
if we think of the city not only as a field of discrete 
actors, but as a seamless, radiant field. This is the 
big question about the city, a very different approach 
from older ways of looking, for instance through 
class analysis.
[Email correspondence December 2009] Marga-
ret Crawford: For me, a more important question 
than the human / non-human is to understand the 
agency of the unintentional actor - the slum dweller 
or street vendor, who, through everyday practices, 
challenges existing ways of thinking, or reveals new 
economic, social and cultural possibilities. Although 
the results may be very different from the inten-
tions (and certainly any reduction of these to simple 
survival needs to be questioned) they can have very 
powerful implications for architecture and politics. 
Years ago, Ernest Pascucci told me that ‘popular 
culture does the work of theory’. We are seeing 
more and more of this ‘theory from the bottom up’ 
and we need to pay attention to it.
[London, 23 January 2009] Kenny Cupers and 
Isabelle Doucet: In contrast to the reflexive process 
of production, circulation and consumption you 
describe in Global Culture Industry, and despite 
the complexity of actions building entails, architec-
un-intentionality - the unintended consequences of 
any action - which brings us to the question of the 
contemporary city.
Antoine Picon: Well, my own take on this comes 
from my work on the notion of the cyborg, or what 
I call disrupted identity. We are no longer trapped 
within our own bodies, we live in the space of medi-
ation and we fully inhabit our various mediations. 
This is a model you can see at different levels, from 
molecules and genes to the universe. In molecu-
lar biology for instance, recent research indicates 
that genes do not follow an assembly line model, 
but need to be thought of as a society of bits and 
proteins that function in a complex network. This 
is also how we can conceive of society: the indi-
vidual is no longer a dot, but a network. Even the 
human body can be seen as a society of modules 
that interact with each other. So the big question for 
architecture then is: how do we build for a society of 
networks, a society of networked individuals? I think 
this is where social meaning can be reconstructed. 
And this has direct implications for the human /non-
human divide. Latour is continually fascinated by the 
fact that we are constituting hybrids of human and 
non-human. But for me, the most important thing is 
to begin from the fact that we are always truly and 
intimately spatialised. This is why Sloterdijk is really 
interesting, especially in the first volume of Spheres, 
where he says about two interacting faces, that the 
spirit or the mind is actually in between, and not in 
the mind or head of the individuals. This suspends 
for me the question of whether it is human or non-
human. I think we are still very Cartesian in our 
reluctance to envisage that we fully inhabit space 
as human beings - and today’s space is a very 
peculiar one, a networked space full of artefacts. 
One of my hypotheses at the moment is that ‘affect’ 
is something that characterises not what happens 
in the head, but what happens through this kind of 
spatialised identity - which is why ‘affect’ is linking 
object and subject and in some ways transcending 
the distinction between them. 
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nary, no longer being separated.
Kenny Cupers: Is this how you understand the inter-
twining of art and architecture in the global culture 
industries?
Scott Lash: Design especially, and perhaps also 
architectural design, really works in this register of 
taste, as do the culture industries. It’s funny to me 
that Bourdieu ends up being a sociological positivist 
really, making critique impossible. His social critique 
of judgement is almost like a critique of critique: 
critique’s critique is that critique is not possible. So 
I’m coming back to the idea of immanent critique, 
as in Critique of Information, and Global Culture 
Industry.
Isabelle Doucet: Critique no longer from above, but 
as you say, from within. In the realm of architecture, 
this brings us to the idea of a ‘critique through 
practice’ - against what is perceived as the more 
conventional domain of critique, namely theory. 
But how exactly could practice then be critical in a 
different way? And is it then people like Koolhaas 
you see as doing this?
Scott Lash: Not really. What you’ve got is this fantas-
tic invention that’s going on. I think what people 
like Koolhaas do is start from the register of taste 
and then somehow open it up, into the sphere of 
freedom, in the Kantian sense. And what we always 
thought of as just taste, also has this other, namely 
freedom. Critique through practice is one thing we 
wanted to do with the Centre for Cultural Studies, 
whether it’s new media or shows or whatever. 
Isabelle Doucet: Do you think this is the way new 
theory can be produced today? Because we also 
continue to see it being produced high up, and 
then trickling down. Is this model still applicable? 
Are there practitioners now who really change 
the turns of the theoretical discussion? Or do we 
need to understand this as part of some kind of 
tural production is still very conservative about the 
notion of authorship. Is this symptomatic of a more 
fundamental specificity of architecture compared to 
other forms of cultural production? How is architec-
ture’s being-in-the-world different? Can we consider 
agency in architecture beyond the attribution of indi-
vidual intentionality, and if so, what happens to the 
idea of criticality?
Scott Lash: Architecture is different because... 
Critique always has some kind of transcendental, 
is always outside of the empirical with which we are 
engaging. And I think art surely is: it always opens 
out into something that is transcendental. But I don’t 
think architecture does in the same way. Architec-
ture and design are largely about taste. In Kant’s 
third critique, he criticises more empiricist thinkers, 
who talk about taste all the time. And taste is some-
thing that is completely empirical, that does not 
open up into what Kant calls the sphere of freedom. 
Whereas art does. And judgement does, at least in 
the sense of the third critique. Judgement always 
opens out into either a ‘to come’, in Lyotard’s sense, 
or some sort of sphere of freedom, the prophecy of 
criticality, and so on.
Kenny Cupers: The same way Bourdieu’s critique 
of taste is one-dimensionally social, leading to a 
closed realm?
Scott Lash: That’s exactly what I was thinking yes. 
Bourdieu’s is a social critique of judgement, in 
French critique social du jugement, and Kant’s is a 
judgement critique of the social, moving it exactly 
the other way around. But the thing about design 
and architecture is that they work much more 
through taste, whereas art moves right on to the 
sphere of freedom. Architecture remains very much 
in the register of taste but sometimes it moves up to 
that other realm. The work of Koolhaas or Hadid has 
something transcendental about it in some ways. Or 
the transcendental and the empirical collapse in it, 
which is also perhaps the symbolic and the imagi-
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key is to start from the situation, and the legibility of 
the situation. 
Isabelle Doucet: Perhaps one of the more useful 
ideas in Latour is exactly this proposal to start 
from the complexity of the situation - in the sense 
of what Isabelle Stengers and others have called 
an imbroglio - and then to retrace the threads. How 
feasible, innovative or fruitful is such an approach to 
you, considering that it doesn’t allow you to predict 
where it will lead you to?
Scott Lash: Because I’m critical of the notion of 
action, I come to it from a slightly different direction. 
There are assumptions of instrumental rationality in 
terms of what the network does; that I think also 
sometimes is a network of individuals. That’s why 
I prefer to use Marilyn Strathern, who really starts 
from the relation. The question is how, in terms 
of research. It’s a really good question. In Global 
Culture Industry we were influenced by Appadurai, 
Kopytoff, as much as by Latour and also just by the 
research itself. 
What is valid knowledge, in a way, is the question. 
It is a different kind of method. It’s not even a labora-
tory. I’m not trying to discredit Latour, Koolhaas or 
Obrist in their use of the notion of laboratory, but it is 
not a laboratory at all: it is just the opposite, you’re 
out there where it’s happening. A laboratory means 
control, and this, in contrast, is engaging with the 
fabric. If it’s an experiment, it’s another kind of 
experiment, not a laboratory experiment. Almost like 
social engineering, not in the proper sense, or even 
the social democratic sense, but social engineering 
that doesn’t really know what’s going on. Social 
and material engineering, socio-material engineer-
ing. In which you’re dealing with a material-social 
environment and you try to work with it, as much as 
possible, as a planner or researcher, or both. 
Isabelle Doucet: It seems that one should at least 
acknowledge the engineering through several labo-
move against theory - considering that in architec-
ture culture there seems to be such a paradoxical 
tendency recently?
Scott Lash: Well, I think it’s a very theoretical thing 
to do, to theorise the end of theory. It mirrors the 
attention given to Latour today. His is perhaps the 
most influential paradigm in sociology today. And 
Latour is brilliant and a very implicit theorist. But he 
doesn’t really write theory. I find it slightly disingenu-
ous, to constantly put theory down, and yet have 
such a strong stake in theory at the same time: to 
say ‘we can’t be asking the big questions’ and at the 
same time really asking them. Then why put other 
people down who are asking it too? 
Kenny Cupers: Might it be because he too is infatu-
ated with the real, as you mentioned before?
Scott Lash: I don’t think it’s critical theory that he 
does. For me, it is individualist because it starts with 
the individual actant, and then the networks kind of 
come from the individual actant. I don’t think it starts 
from relations. 
Kenny Cupers: What would a more relational 
approach be like?
Scott Lash: It would start from the relation, and 
wouldn’t presume that these actor networks are 
somehow strategically power-oriented, are engag-
ing and combating each other. 
I don’t think theory has ever stopped a war. I 
do think that there are exchanges. The art sector 
surely has taken on theory and theorists in a huge 
way. Conceptual art especially. And also what you 
could almost call conceptual architecture. Not just 
Rem, but also Multiplicity, with Stefano Boeri. A kind 
of exploration of urban change on the ground, like 
in China, a ground that seems laden with concepts 
and ideas. Either the work or looking at what is 
going on makes you think as a theorist. I think the 
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ratories, and explore not only their different modes 
of experimentation and knowledge production, but 
also the interaction between them... 
Scott Lash: We need to figure out how to think 
about experimentation outside of the lab, and even 
beyond the laboratory model. A different notion of 
experiment. That’s why I’m thinking an engineer-
ing experiment, a socio-material engineering, which 
sounds like a swear word, because it sounds too old-
fashioned social-democratic,  you know, but maybe 
it’s interesting to use a kind of engineering meta-
phor to think about it. It gives you a strong material 
aspect as well as a strong social aspect. And maybe 
we’re situated, entering a different kind of planning. 
Where you are, as much as possible, into the fabric, 
and things are arising from that. It’s not objective 
knowledge, because you only get there through a 
huge involvement. 
And I think this ultimately brings us back to the 
notion of relationality. It is not just that the relation 
comes before the individual, but that our rela-
tion comes right before you and me, and does not 
come out of your or my intention. The intentions will 
come from the relation rather.  And the other thing 
is that it is somewhere between the virtual and the 
actual. It is not the virtual and not the actual, it is 
in between the two. The virtual gets actualised and 
then it’s done. This is something that is in between 
the virtual and the actual, always continuing. Politics 
are very different when you start from the situation, 
when you start from something that is much more 
relational, that is not from the individual at all. And 
that is something that we need to take on board, 
urgently, here in the West. 
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